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Abstract 
China and India are emerging as major new entrants in the international software industry. Both 
are rapidly learning through outsourcing with multinational enterprises from advanced nations. 
Yet, their paths to this dynamic sector are very different. Chinese software firms have focused on 
their domestic market by working with foreign MNCs, while they move cautiously abroad. Indian 
firms, despite already being large, continue to expand overseas as well as to climb the value 
chain. We show that a macro perspective on the global movement of work can be gained by 
utilizing concepts from different approaches to the MNC. At the same time, the innovation 
systems perspective is necessary to explain the foundations of the industry. The paper provides 
hypotheses and performs an initial validation of them. It concludes that the internationalization 
and learning processes are somewhat different in the Chinese and Indian MNCs, and provides 
explanations for the different patterns. 
 
Key words: Outsourcing, software industry, industrial development, multinational enterprise 
JEL Classification: P45, O14, O32, L23  
 
UNU-MERIT Working Papers 
ISSN 1871-9872 
 
Maastricht Economic and social Research and training centre on Innovation and Technology, UNU-
MERIT 
 
UNU-MERIT Working Papers intend to disseminate preliminary results of research carried 
out at the Centre to stimulate discussion on the issues raised. 
 
                                                
1
 niosi.jorge@uqam.ca  
2
 tedt@smu.edu.sg  
 4 
 5 
Introduction 
The software industry is experiencing a major delocalisation trend, from developed to developing 
countries. In this trend, MNC from both developed and developing countries are playing a major 
role. In the 1980s and 1990s, India took the lead in attracting this industry, due to its large pool of 
skilled low cost labour. Ireland and Israel followed suit. Since 2000, China and other developing 
countries have been entering this fast growing industry.  
 
The first section recalls some landmark contributions to the theory of the MNC, and derives 
testable hypotheses from these perspectives. The second section summarizes the history of the 
software industry. In the third section, the paper brings forward a “history-friendly” but 
contemporary discussion of India and China’s MNCs in the global software sector, and finally, 
by a return to theory to suggest the interest in the future integration of these perspectives. 
 
What we seek to develop in this paper is a way of explaining both the differences and similarities 
of the growth and subsequent internationalization strategies of Chinese and Indian software firms 
(to the extent that internalization is taking place). With this in mind, we have chosen to study and 
compare two giants that present very different trajectories – one emerged (India) and one 
emerging (China). In the comparison of these two case studies and their different traditions, we 
hope to develop theory that fits the empirical evidence and stylized facts on software thus far. We 
will show that, in order to understand the internationalization of emerging economy firms, 
including with regards to the newer services sectors, we have to understand, on the one hand, the 
entry mode of the firms (into whichever market – export or domestic – and the learning 
opportunities the mode presented, and on the other, the relationships local (emerging economy) 
firms engaged in with foreign clients or multinational providers of those services. As we show, 
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theories of internationalization based on the now-developed countries can take us so far – we 
need to infuse a further understanding of how latecomers to the services industries were able to 
enter. In other words, a process-based view of emerging economy software firms is as critical 
now as it was to understanding the most recent case – late stage industrialization in East Asia. 
 
1.  Theories: multinational corporations and innovation systems 
Multinational corporations (MNC) have been the subjects of a multifarious literature. Starting 
with Raymond Vernon and the product life cycle approach, through the synthetic approach of 
John Dunning, towards the more recent evolutionary theories of Kogut and Zander, authors have 
emphasized proprietary advantages of these firms, the internalisation of such advantages in order 
to slow down the entry of imitators, and the choice of location for foreign investment on the basis 
of different criteria. 
 
Product life cycles 
In the PLC perspective, new industries are born in the richest countries, most often under the 
aegis of one innovative company (Vernon, 1966). Later, imitators and competitors emerge in the 
same country where the innovation was created, and compete for such market. In this first phase, 
many different designs appear and the market is reduced, due to the novelty of the product or 
service, its uncertain value and usefulness, and the competition of several design. In a second 
stage, entry rates fall, the industry starts to concentrate in the innovative country, and producers 
start to export to other nations with similar per capita revenue. In a third phase, products begin to 
converge towards a dominant design, product innovation falls, and process innovation increases. 
Also, the first innovators make direct investments in the second cohort countries in order to try to 
pre-empt the entry of competitors. In a fourth phase, leading companies based in developed 
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countries invest in developing nations in order to reduce costs, as both product and process 
innovations in the industry decline. Entry declines sharply: this is a period of shakeout, and 
strong exit, as well as uncertainty reduction. In the final stage, the industry localises itself in 
developing countries, and third world multinationals emerge (Wells, 1983).  
 
It is possible to derive testable propositions from the PLC approach.  
Hypothesis #1: The software industry was born in the largest and richest country, 
then emerged in other advanced nations, and it is now maturing and delocalising 
towards developing countries. Thus the older MNC are based in the original 
innovative country. 
 
Hypothesis #2: In the international pecking order, any country that nurtures the 
industry starts producing for the internal market, exporting products and services and 
then conducting foreign direct investment. 
 
Hypothesis #3: In the maturation period, third world multinationals emerge; their 
ownership advantages include, among others “appropriate technology” (software 
more suited to developing countries) as well as organizational advantages (better 
capability to hire and train workers from developing countries). 
 
While the international business tradition has focused on the role of multinationals in emerging 
economies, as of yet, it has not focused as much on hypothesis #3 – that of emerging economies 
as a generator of multinationals (Ramamurti, 2004). At the same time, to fully understand the 
paths by which firms in certain economies come up, it is necessary to appreciate the learning and 
absorptive capability of the emerging economy firms, as well as the possible role of foreign 
multinational enterprises in those emerging economies (Meyer, 2004). The nature of emerging 
economy MNC emergence is well represented by and amply studied in India’s case for the new 
services sector. Our paper will examine whether Indian MNCs’ are continuing an inexorable 
march along the ‘conventional’ MNC developmental trajectory. For the second half of the 
statement relating to the effects of foreign MNCs, much of the literature has already examined 
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how “demonstration effects” (i.e. local entrepreneurs striving to imitate MNCs) and movement of 
labor as the primary channels behind which MNCs influence emerging economies (Meyer, 2004). 
However, there are also rich studies in the phases of industrialization in electronics and other 
manufacturing sectors that showed how developed economy clients also assisted their 
‘outsourcing’ partners in the emerging economies directly through technology transfer and 
training.3 Indeed, our paper illustrates that, for the case of China, and probably in India’s past, 
such knowledge exchange also occurred in the newer, more knowledge-intensive sectors, where 
presumably intellectual capital and analytical work is more important than manufacturing process 
and machinery operation. 
 
The synthetic approach 
John Dunning (1988, 1998) built the successful synthetic (OLI) approach to the MNC. He 
forcefully argued that besides ownership advantages emphasized in the PLC theory, and the 
related internalisation strategy, MNCs did not all chose the same destinations for their FDI. 
Location specific factors matter. Across host countries, factors including natural resources, cheap 
labour, market size, as well as more “institutional” factors, such as intellectual property 
regulation, incentives for R&D, high-class universities and government laboratories, may present 
different advantages to different industries at different times. It is worth underlining that the OLI 
perspective allows a linkage with more macro theories, such as the innovation system approach, 
that emphasize the key role of institutions in economic development. There is reason to believe 
that these observations might also apply to emerging markets. Thus, from the synthetic approach, 
we can derive a few hypotheses: 
                                                
3
 For examples, see the various studies of Sanjaya Lall. 
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Hypothesis #4: The destination of FDI of Chinese and Indian MNC will follow 
existing patterns of export; that is, Indian MNCs will invest in North America and 
Western Europe, and Chinese MNCs will invest in Japan. Such countries are the 
largest and more affluent markets of third world software multinationals. 
 
Hypothesis #5: Chinese and Indian MNCs will invest in other developing countries in 
order to compensate for the depletion and higher costs of their home market labour 
pool, as well as to exploit their organizational and technological advantages in foreign 
markets. 
 
The evolutionary approach to MNCs 
Kogut and Zander (1993, 2003) built their theory of the MNC on the work of Winter (1986/2006) 
and Nelson (1991). Companies differ in the quality and quantity of the stocks of knowledge they 
possess, thus they follow different strategies. There is no representative firm, but a whole range 
of competencies, strategies and structures. Yet, companies based in the same country may display 
some similarities as they are submitted to similar environmental constraints. Kogut and Zander 
also built on the dynamic capabilities approach, which also emerged from the landmark work by 
Nelson and Winter and was eventually formalized by Teece (1994, 1997). 
 
On these bases, Kogut and Zander pioneered the evolutionary and knowledge-based theory of the 
MNC. In their view, “knowledge and learning are at the root of understanding how competitive 
advantage is gained and sustained“ (Foss and Pedersen, 2004: 342). For Kogut and Zander, 
multinational companies produce knowledge and search for new and complementary knowledge, 
both in their domestic and international markets. Also, a high proportion of knowledge is tacit, 
embodied in human experience, and circulates within the MNC through its personnel. Firms are 
social communities that create and use knowledge in the production of goods and services. MNC 
are firms that combine, create, acquire and transfer knowledge from different national sources.  
Hypothesis #6: Software companies based in LDCs invest abroad in order to both 
exploit and increase their knowledge assets. 
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Innovation systems 
The institutional factors that the OLI perspective has put forward have been more properly taken 
into consideration by the innovation system approach pioneered by Freeman (1987), Lundvall 
(1992) and Nelson (1993). Economic development is the result not only of the transfer of 
technologies by companies of advanced nations into developing countries but also by the 
concomitant growth of human capital and supporting institutions in such countries. Such 
supporting institutions nurture the creation of human capital, allow the assimilation and the 
mastering of foreign technology, and support an evolutionary process through which developing 
countries upgrade their technological capabilities. These capabilities are upgraded in both the 
public and private sector. It would be needless to underline the fact that numerous incentives are 
required to propel companies, public laboratories and universities to conduct R&D and 
innovation, as to allow them to understand and manage foreign technology. National institutions 
are required for such assimilation and upgrading, and they must display some degree of congruity 
and complementarities into a national system of innovation (Mohnen and Röller, 2005; Nelson, 
2005)  
Hypothesis # 7: The software industry and software MNC will grow in countries 
where efficient and effective policy and related national and regional institutional 
incentives have been put in place to support the development of the industry. 
 
Approach 
We will now turn to an examination of the characteristics of the global computer software sector 
to help us contextualize these hypotheses for the purposes of our cases. We will utilize a 
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combination of secondary and primary data in order to bring out a general, yet firm-specific 
understanding of the developmental processes and paths.4  
 
 
2.  The computer software sector 
The computer software and services sector (CSS) emerged in the United States within the 
computer manufacturing industry, from which it progressively detached itself. The emergence of 
the present day industry occurred in the United States through different stages (Hoch et al, 2000).  
 
The evolution of the industry 
In the first era (1950-59) independent programming services firms appeared to provide programs 
that IBM did not already sell embedded in its mainframes. Clients for such programs were 
government departments and large corporations using the large computers produced at that time. 
The second era (1959-69) was that of the packaged software products, following the introduction 
of the minicomputer by Digital Equipment Corporation (DEC). The minicomputer created the 
first mass market for software, and the new niche added itself to the professional services one, 
that still subsists. In the third era (1959-81) many independent solutions providers entered the 
market, as IBM was forced to sell its mainframe unbundled from its software. The fourth period 
(1981-1994) was marked by the personal computer (PC), and it was the period when the 
computer software industry became a large and global one. Also, in this era Microsoft, founded 
in 1975, became the world leader of the industry. IBM decided to outsource its PC operating 
system (OS) to Microsoft and DOS, and later Windows became the most popular OS. By the end 
                                                
4
 Much of the secondary and primary data are based on data collected under studies of India and China by the 
authors. Approximately 27 firms were interviewed in India, and well over 30 firms have been interviewed in China, 
including eight in the latter that were outsourcing-specific. All the interviews were conducted between 2001 and the 
present. The interview data are drawn upon for rich process descriptions of selected (if not representative) firms.  
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of 2007, all Microsoft operating systems still represented close to 95% of the PC market. During 
this era, the CSS grew by 20% a year to become one of the largest world industries. The present 
era (1995->) started with the emergence of Internet. A new series of companies were created 
selling browsers and creating a new niche within the industry: e-commerce. In 2004, IBM 
became one of the major software and outsourcing companies, through the sale of its PC division 
to China’s Lenovo, yet kept its mainframe manufacturing business.  
 
Today’s computer software industry is usually presented as being composed of some 27 niches, 
including accounting and finance, business intelligence, e-commerce, enterprise resource 
planning, multimedia, office, operating systems and supply chain management. Microsoft 
dominates the OS and office niches, while Oracle and SAP try to dominate the enterprise 
segments under the pressure of the world largest, IBM and Microsoft. The industry is now 
consolidating itself, as companies once specialised in one particular niche are now “invading” the 
niches once served by other firms.   
 
Key traits and stylized facts of the CSS industry 
The CSS is made of different activities and types of companies. The original software producers 
are the computer hardware manufacturers, such as IBM, Apple, HP, Sun Microsystems, and 
Toshiba. The specialised computer software firms are called the independent software vendors 
(ISVs) such as Computer Associates, Microsoft, Oracle, or SAP. These produce mainly computer 
software applications, and there are thousands of them in every industrial country. While over 
decades, the leadership of the sector has changed, over the last decade or more, the top software 
vendors have remained more or less the same. This suggests the first stylized facts: 
 Most software design capabilities are located in developed countries  
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 The dominance of US vendors remains unabated 
The CSS industry is composed of several activities. In terms of employment or sales, the most 
important of them are software publishing, systems design, systems integration, custom computer 
programming and data processing.  
 
Some of the larger corporations (HP, IBM, Microsoft, Oracle or SAP) produce a large range of 
applications. Other companies are specialized in specific niche applications; the largest Israeli 
companies, for instance, are all market niche players offering applications for specialized markets 
(Breznitz, 2005). Thousands of software publishers are active in each developed country, most of 
them being small and medium size enterprises. The fact that firms can in this day and age still 
start up small and become large if not influential over night suggests the following stylized facts: 
 There are low barriers to entry: all that is needed are a small number of programmers and 
computers with the adequate hardware and software. 
 Product development, particularly for prototype software or the first of a kind, can 
sometimes be completed in terms of weeks or months 
 Increasing returns and network externalities are very significant and can lead to small 
firms becoming leaders over very short periods of time. 
 Intellectual property is protected by copyrights, trademarks and patents but this latter 
mechanism of protection is confined to the largest companies 
In rigorous terms, the entire CSS sector is a service industry, even if some of these services are 
sold as packaged software products. Software “products” are divided into categories as operating 
systems, middleware and applications. Yet, the industry distinguishes between software 
“products” (packaged software) and services (all the rest, including the customization and 
maintenance of products and the provision of services around those products). Yet, the division 
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between software products and services is increasingly blurring. A piece of software produced for 
a particular client (e.g. custom made software, or a “service”) can later be modified, “packaged” 
partially or totally, and sold by the thousands of copies, or hosted in a server and provided as 
another “service” on-line to thousands of clients. Indeed, it is not easy to claim that making 
products is superior to, and offers higher value added than, services. 
 
The world packaged software industry is estimated to be around US$ 250 billion in 2007, 50% of 
which is still hold by US companies. North American and Western European companies tend to 
obtain a larger percentage of sales from applications (“products”) but they also provide services 
(hosting, systems integration, custom software, data entry). Developing countries’ firms produce 
more “services” than “products” as the needs for services like customization, maintenance and 
the like requires substantial amounts of technically skilled manpower. Table 1 gives some 
information about the segments of the IT market. 
(Table 1 here) 
In spite of its large size, the CSS still does not represent the entire picture. Specialized software 
firms do not create all the software produced every year. Manufacturing and service firms such as 
aircraft, automobile, electrical appliances, machinery, and telecommunication equipment 
manufacturers, as well as banks, insurance, engineering firms and other service companies, create 
software for their own use. This other software (“embedded” software, that is, software imprinted 
on hardware) is usually not sold separately in the market.5 The manufacturing or financial 
corporations (and their clients) based in developed countries regularly outsource some of the 
                                                
5
 The size of this “embedded “ software sector is not known but it may represent, in terms of employment and value 
added, a chunk of economic activity as large as the computer software industry itself. The frontiers between the CSS 
and the embedded sector are fuzzy, because at any time an independent software vendor may be acquired by a 
manufacturing firm and converted into an internal “embedded” software division; conversely, we witness the regular 
spun of internal software departments from financial services or manufacturing firms. 
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software development to firms based in developing countries such as China and India. Thus, 
these countries are exporting software that, if not outsourced, would not appear in any statistics as 
separate products.  
 An offshoring is ensuing: the trend towards international outsourcing specific parts and 
modules, mostly in developing countries such as China and India, thus integrating 
independent companies in such countries in the global value chains of the industry, in 
order to reduce costs, and accelerate product development and service delivery. 
As software became increasingly modular, more and more offshoring has taken place under the 
imperative of cost and quality control: 
 Modularity has facilitated offshoring of specific modules and even larger pieces of 
software – as designed in developed countries – to third parties, increasingly in 
developing nations. 
Taken together, this broader notion of software, along with the service nature of much of 
software development suggests the need for substantial amounts of human capital, which can be 
posited as the following stylized fact: 
 As a whole, software is a labour intensive industry with highly skilled human capital as its 
main input. 
 
As developing countries like India first entered the markets, scaling up both firm sizes as well as 
project sizes became a critical goal. This resulted in the first Indian multinationals – true 
megaliths that rival some of the largest US software services firms in size. 
 There has been an emergence of multinational corporations based in developed countries 
(the United States in the first place) but increasingly also in developing countries (Indian 
MNCs being the most evident). 
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Yet, there are clearer signals now that the countries most successful at developing outsourcing 
sectors have actually benefited from age-old public policies, but at the same time, there are fewer 
investments needed in this sector (i.e. fixed costs are lower): 
 There is generally a lower need for investments, but public support for higher education 
and human capital continue to be important in this sector as with prior ones. 
The questions this brief review raises are, firstly, whether the Indian firms are approaching the 
levels of value added activity attained by the “original” CSS firms in the developed regions, and 
secondly, whether there is room for new players (and whether new paths to industrialization are 
part of that, containing some of the same initial conditions as India’s path). We will now turn to 
an examination of our two cases to illuminate the answers to these questions. 
 
3. The Indian software sector 
 
Entry into the software industry 
The Indian software sector has been extensively analyzed, even if important issues remain to be 
debated (Arora et al., 2001; Arora and Athreye, 2002; Athreye, 2005; Joseph, 2006). It is clear 
that Indian companies started their development most often as subcontractors to international 
corporations based in developed countries. While software exports from India started in the 
1980s, the real take-off occurred in the 1990s: from $105 million in 1989, exports attained $6,2 
billion in 2000, and around $32 billion in 2007, growing by over 30% a year. The Indian industry 
target is $60 billion in software exports by 2010. In 2007, software services represent over 22% 
of total Indian exports ($140 billion) and are its main export item. India is by far the largest 
software exporter among LDCs, and trails only the US and Ireland in the world. 
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Also, most exporting firms are Indian owned-and controlled corporations (Table 2). Such 
corporations learned most often in the course of outsourcing contracts with international 
corporations. Several issues are worth recalling. The first is the set of factors that explain such a 
trend. The second is the explanation of the upgrading process, particularly the conditions that 
mitigate and facilitate this.6 
(Table 2 here) 
3.1. The Rise of India 
The most common explanation of India’s growth is one in terms of comparative advantage: India 
has a vast pool of skilled English speaking programmers and engineers, whose salary was 
historically much lower than those of similar personnel in North America and Western Europe 
(Athreye, 2005). The second explanation, also put forward in the literature, is in terms of trade 
liberalization. Despite the earlier protectionist stance of the government, the rules on foreign 
investment were eventually relaxed in the 1980s, and the Indian software industry eventually 
benefited from the trade liberalization that took place in the early 1990s. Multinational 
corporations based in advanced countries invested in the Indian software industry and accelerated 
learning and knowledge diffusion. Also, trade liberalisation allowed the import of advanced 
computer equipment, and suppressed taxes on software exports. 
 
A third explanation is in terms of industrial policy (Athreye, 2005; Balakrishnan, 2006). The 
national government promoted the industry through many different schemes. Many of them were 
implemented during the import substitution era, including the requirement that Indian firms 
                                                
6
 Throughout this section, we will rely on a combination of secondary information such as annual reports and news 
sources, as well as interviews that one of the author has had with firms in the industry (approximately 15 interviews 
with Indian software firms were conducted in 2001, and follow up conversations were made with employees of 
selected firms since then). 
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produce software for nationally owned computer manufacturers. Later, in 1991, the national 
government set up an organization, Software Technology Parks of India, which built some 41 
technology “parks” across the country. The scheme was aimed at promoting exports, and by 
2005, over two thirds of exports in the country took place from such parks. Finally, public 
expenditure in higher education from previous years was high by any standards, and public 
investment in the Indian telecommunications infrastructure increased substantially since the 
implementation of the 1991 liberalisation policy. 
 
Another explanation centres on the outsourcing requirements from developed countries, whose 
labour pool came under pressure as outsourcing and complexity software became a norm with the 
global increase in IT use and efforts to increase productivity from that use. This demand arose in 
both the CSS industry and many other software-using sectors. In India, the defining source of 
work was the ‘Y2K’ problem, which required many US, European and other MNCs to rework 
older software prior to the arrival of the year 2000 (Y2K). Thus, even as the basics of the human 
resource supply and basic organizational capability was forming in response to market needs, it 
was further enabled by the combined effects of trade, industrial and human capital policies, 
allowing India to take advantage of this upsurge in outsourcing. Even after the Y2K issue, the 
outsourcing contracts that firms gained continued to become progressively larger and more 
complex (Athreye, 2005b). Also, in spite of the fact that the larger companies in Table 2 
represented an important share of exports, dozens of other companies are also exporting software 
form India. Outsourcing within global value chains has represented the main learning opportunity 
for Indian firms. The early acquisition of capability was also at its heart driven by foreign clients 
that were hungry to move non-core or non-high-end work overseas. Our own interviews confirm 
the general impression in the industry that providers learnt from their clients, e.g. an interviewee 
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at Wipro cited that they learnt a considerable amount from early clients like Nortel in the 
telecommunication and other sectors (author’s interview). 
 
3.2. Upgrading  
Upgrading in Services 
Since the early 2000s, Indian firms have been moving up the value chain, in part driven by the 
natural needs of their clients (Arora et al 1999), and in part by the Indian firms’ desire to upgrade 
themselves. Since most Indian firms started on a technical basis (i.e., providing programming, 
skills then, higher level project level capabilities incorporating those same skills), their natural 
tendency has been to build strong technological capabilities, and to hone their employees’ skills 
at the latest technology – be it programming languages or technological domains like wireless 
communications. An example of this is Wipro, which has been an exemplar in how it developed 
its technical and R&D competencies in the telecommunications industry and other engineering 
sectors. 
 
It is partly because of this reputation for technical excellence that Indian software services firms 
have received the perception that they are caught in a technical “services” trajectory that is 
possibly lower value-added than a “product” based one; this is in fact what some industry actors 
also believe to be the case. This is somewhat misleading: many “products” (packaged software) 
are no more complex than many “services” (i.e., custom made or “customized” software) in 
which several Indian firms excel, and the margins have on average been good for the better 
services firms. Systems integration for instance is one of the most complex tasks, one in which 
US firms like EDS, Accenture and IBM have a commanding market share. Indian firms, in 
contrast, have found it more difficult to move into this sphere of work. As a result, Indian firms 
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like Infosys have been attempting to move into higher “systems ends of the software value chain 
as soon as they can. However, Infosys also reported difficulty in moving into “end-to-end” 
systems work, in part because clients did not want to relinquish the highest ends of the work to 
their contractors.7  
 
Another services trend has been the increasing spread of “customization” and other services work 
to other geographic regions. Wipro has been in Japan for some years, and many Indian majors 
including Tata Consultancy Services (TCS) are establishing themselves in China. TCS, the 
largest Indian software firm, has perhaps the most developed multinational strategy in the 
developing countries. TCS has also developed a large Latin American focus, with some 2530 
employees and over $100 million sales for the year in Latin America alone.8 By mid 2007, there 
were 5000 TCS employees in the region, including 800 in Uruguay and 3600 in Brazil and Chile. 
Such a strategic investment was linked to a $260 million outsourcing contract from ABN AMRO 
Latin America, and another similar contract for application development from the same Dutch 
Bank in the same region. Late in 2007, TCS was creating a centre in Guadalajara, Mexico, that 
will hire 500 professionals in the short term to deliver a $400 million contract to the Social 
Security System of Mexico. In all, by early 2008, TCS had over 100,000 employees in 47 
countries and had revenues of $4.3 billion in fiscal 2007 (Table 3). 
(Table 3 here) 
Upgrading via products 
Despite the strength of services, products have continued to provide an allure to many Indian 
companies, either as a dominant strategy or as part of a portfolio of products and services. This is 
                                                
7
 Annual reports, various years. 
8
 The Hindu, June 20, 2006. 
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no doubt due to the observation that the largest and most successful software companies in the 
world are essentially own brand product makers.  
 
Development of products: At the one extreme of the product spectrum - with the most risk and 
potential for the highest profit margins of all strategies - is the own brand product strategy. Some 
Indian companies are already selling their own products with their own brands and trademarks, 
although it has been noted elsewhere that this is a particularly difficult path to follow (Athreye, 
2005). The quintessential case for India has been that of I-Flex – which we will discuss in detail 
as it illustrates the complex challenge of building an own brand products company.9 I-Flex was 
founded in 1991 as a joint venture with Citicorp, with its earlier incarnation being that of an 
internal subsidiary providing services to Citicorp. From the beginning, I-Flex’s leadership 
focused on products, and earmarked financial products as their only sector of focus. It turns out 
that the competition in financial products was less competitive than in other sectors, with existing 
competitors having legacy systems. I-Flex showed acumen by initially branching into other 
emerging markets such as Africa and South East Asia, where competitors were weakly 
represented, and where their lower cost software. They initially started with a comprehensive 
banking product called Microbanker, but eventually worked on a state of the art replacement 
called Flexcube that embodied major (software) architectural improvements. This product 
featured a modular architecture, so that new features could be added on in an extensible manner. 
I-Flex worked with banking clients in countries such as Thailand to populate their product with 
new, relevant features, and also developed a strong group of domain-trained professionals to 
further infuse domain knowledge into the product.  I-Flex eventually won over more and more 
                                                
9
 This section is based on Baba and Tschang (2004) as well as notes from a study described in Tschang, Amsden, and 
Sadagopan (2003). 
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clients in developed markets, and was deemed so successful that in 2006, Oracle acquired a 
majority stake in it, primarily to serve as a domain rich entry to higher value work in the financial 
sector. Despite the success of I-Flex, no other firm has been able to follow its path, in part 
because of the so many things that have to be done right, and in part because products is an 
inherently risky strategy to begin with. Indeed, many Indian firms combine a form of product 
strategy with services.  
 
Because of the low probability of success in own brand products, many Indian firms are moving 
into product development in a more measured way, often via the development of products as a 
service, or the “co-development of products” (i.e. working on behalf of a client). Such activities 
does not carry the risk of making one’s own brand product for the international marketplace. 
Examples of development for other product vendors include Tata Consultancy Services 
development of a popular product for Microsoft, called Quadrem, an electronic marketplace. 
There are numerous other examples of such arrangements (see Table 4).  
(Table 4 here) 
Moving to the Domestic Market: In contrast to the Chinese situation, the Indian domestic 
market is starting to take off after the export opportunities first occurred. NASSCOM recently 
observed that the Indian market for IT hardware and software could be as large as 15.9 billion, 
having grown by 29% in 2006. As a result, Indian firms have recently been eyeing their own 
market as a potential area of growth (e.g. Infosys’ Finacle financial product which is also sold in 
the Indian market). The three largest Indian software multinational corporations (TCS, Infosys 
and Wipro) are not by any means alone in this. There are dozens of other similar firms. Subex, a 
telecommunications software firm founded in 1992, has by now operations in 60 countries, 
having acquired in 2004 Alcatel FMS in the UK, in 2006, Azure Solutions in the UK (for $140 
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million) and in 2007, Syndesis in Canada ($164 million). This year it was quoted in the London 
Stock Exchange. It passed the $100 million mark in sales and 1500 employees.  
 
In summary, it appears that despite the challenges of creating own-branded software products, 
other paths offer a less difficult transition from custom-made software to products or intellectual 
property creation.  
 
Indian MNCs are showing different paths to internationalisation. The vast majority of their 
subsidiaries are located in developed countries. These have mostly been front end sales offices to 
deal with clients, but firms like Infosys are beginning to develop consulting operations. The old 
wave of international branches were located close to their outsourcing markets (most often the 
United States, Canada and the United Kingdom). These were the result of greenfield investments. 
The new wave of foreign subsidiaries is the result of the strategy of acquiring niche product and 
other services companies, and using them in every possible market. Also, some of the largest 
Indian companies are creating subsidiaries in developing countries (Asia and Latin America) in 
order to compensate for the increasing costs of Indian engineers and programmers. Table 5 gives 
an idea of some MNCs based in India. 
(Table 5 here) 
3.3. Upgrading Technological Capability and the role of acquisition 
One major issue faced in upgrading technological capability is the source and strategy for its 
development. To reiterate, after the initial phase of technological learning (from clients), firms 
like Infosys have faced the choice of either growing capability organically (in-house), or to obtain 
it from external sources (acquisition). Historically, the organic growth mode was most dominant. 
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Recently, acquisitions have been increasingly used to acquire competencies, so we will focus on 
this to better illuminate the ongoing changes in the industry: 
 
Many of the largest Indian services companies are adding to their capability by buying foreign 
companies with “products” and specific expertise. For instance, in 2006, I-Flex acquired Mantas, 
a US-based anti-money laundering and compliance software company, for about $122 million 
US. The acquisition trend is also increasing in the top three firms, Infosys, Wipro and TCS. 
Acquisition can be said to be done with at least three purposes in mind (although these are hard to 
disaggregate): to grow a new internal division or software segment, to gain access to 
technological expertise, and to create a “beachhead” in another country to deliver services and 
products to that market. The first two rationales for acquisition appeared to factor into I-Flex’s 
decision, as well as Wipro’s acquisition of SpectraMind for its business process outsourcing 
work. The third appears to be illustrated by Wipro’s recent acquisition of small telecom 
equipment firms in Scandinavia, as well as by Infosys’ acquisition of small product firms in 
Australia and elsewhere. In part, Indian firms are also in effect recognizing the governance of the 
value chain, at least as it exhibits the power of dominant firms, since many of their acquisition 
targets are in foreign markets, and may be intended to serve as “bases” to help the Indian firms to 
operate in those markets. Their acquisition ability is enabled by the higher market capitalization 
of Indian companies (relative to their targets) as well as their need for specific knowledge and 
capabilities.  
 
In sum, many Indian companies have gone through a phase of learning through outsourcing in 
India, and have moved from offering outsourced application development for other companies, to 
working in other regions, as well as moving up in the value chain to producing customized 
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software and “products” for very large customers in industry and government; in cases creating 
their own product brands.  Some product firms are trying to become world leaders in specific 
niches. Aside from I-Flex, such companies include Brainvisa in e-learning, Subex in fraud 
telecommunications software, and Hexaware in human resources software. The upgrading of 
technology capability in order to perform this advanced work is accomplished through different 
channels, not the least being by the acquisition of foreign firms (and their capability and presence 
in markets). The idea that an Indian software firm can upgrade along the GVC by purchasing a 
product company is not without precedent. For instance, China’s Lenovo’s global ambitions 
drove its acquisition of the IBM brand of personal computer. Perhaps another greater 
differentiator in software is the ability of firms to couple product development to customization 
services, in effect deriving benefits from both sides of the VC, or alternatively, to even forego the 
product sales stage in lieu of a pure service (e.g. Web-based service) route.  
 
4. The Chinese software sector 
In the case of China, the Chinese firms’ capabilities are somewhat behind India’s because of the 
China’s follower status. Even then, the industry is thriving, in large part due to domestic and 
regional opportunities. Our data are organized around the origins of the industry, the factors that 
appear to drive industry locating behaviour and growth, and the manner by which firms have 
upgraded themselves technologically by their work with MNCs.  
 
The Chinese software industry was in the early 2000s considered by the central government to be 
so critical to industrial development that, along with semiconductors, it was promoted along with 
semiconductors as one of two new lead sectors (Tschang and Xue, 2005). The government has 
played a key role in the software industry by forming human capital, such as in funding software 
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engineering training programs; by funding research at universities and government research 
institutes as well as in the companies themselves; and by procurement policies which have helped 
selected product companies. Regional governments have also provided infrastructure by way of 
building science parks.   
 
In the early stage of the industry (up to 2001), many Chinese software firms first attempted to 
work on a product model (sometimes involving a basic product that was customized for no more 
than a few customers), or a systems integration model. By working in their domestic market, 
Chinese firms have in effect managed to move (or to be positive, “leapfrog”) straight into 
services. There have been some successes at products, including Kingdee and UFIDA in 
enterprise management software, Kingsoft for language translation and office productivity 
software, Tongtech for middleware and Red Flag software for Linux operating systems. 
Interestingly, none of these firms had government origins (although some such as Red Flag 
software did initially benefit from government procurement contracts, and many benefited at least 
partly from government funding of R&D). Other product companies strong enough to compete at 
the middle end or near the high end of the market include those making financial and enterprise 
software. However, all of these typically compete only in the domestic markets, and foreign 
multinationals have become very strong at the high end of the markets, suggesting that the early 
capabilities of domestic firms were wanting enough to make it hard for them to catch up. 
Arguably, the only firm that have managed to compete one on one with multinationals in the 
same product market has been Red Flag, and this because they have partly been aided by state 
support (namely purchasing contracts), and partly relied on the global open source community for 
the operating system code. While they benefited early on from government research support, Red 
Flag has also made a success of their deeper knowledge of the highly local markets. Their 
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distributor and training networks are considered more effective by many customers over 
Microsoft’s, and as a result, over the last few years, they have recently scored more successes 
with server sites than Microsoft. 
 
Despite the successes of some firms in the domestic market, many Chinese software companies – 
product and services firms alike – are finding it hard to compete in that market. Their early 
capabilities were ill-formed or immature, and they have never been able to upgrade themselves. 
For example, the largest of the early systems integrators thrived on simple work, e.g. connecting 
off-the-shelf hardware and software, but most are now facing low margins and poor prospects for 
growth. The road for product companies has also been generally hard due to a variety of reasons, 
including a lack of customer IT maturity, fragmented markets, and intense competition on the 
low end from low cost domestic imitators and at the high end from financially well-off foreign 
MNCs with advanced technology (Tschang and Xue, 2005).10 Another problem facing systems 
integration was that it generally involved a lower form of work, including installation of 
hardware and packaged software (made by other companies) and networking. One of the largest 
systems integrators that we interviewed earlier admitted that their profits were quite low, and in 
fact, there have also been recent reports of other systems integrators suffering low margins 
(Tschang and Xue, 2005). According to one interviewee, they may also have difficulty in trying 
to upgrade themselves along the value chain. It was partly because of this that Chinese firms 
started to see outsourcing as a way out. According to an official from the Beijing Software 
                                                
10
 In certain types of software such as enterprise software, the best Chinese firms tend to service only the small and 
medium enterprises, while in other software such as personal computer-based software, the best Chinese firms can 
compete with MNCs to some degree. However, other weaknesses in the firms or market can affect firms’ 
performance (Tschang and Xue, 2005). Piracy is one of the problems that afflict product firms. One well known 
product company that we interviewed (both in 2001 and 2006) noted recently that their well known product was so 
heavily pirated that it became a money loser, and it was only the government stepping in to require their software in 
procurement contracts which helped to save this line of business for them. 
 28 
Industry Productivity Centre (BSIPC), the margins from outsourcing were in the 30% range for 
the better Chinese firms (which mirrors margins from India), as opposed to being on the order of 
10% or less – as product and systems integration companies have experienced. Thus, the 
outsourcers have ostensibly avoided trying to make products or to undertake systems integration 
work. 
 
While there have been small amounts of software exporting activity, with software outsourcing 
exports of $600 million in 2004, this was forecasted to increase to $4.7 billion by 2009, or a 
compounded annual growth rate of 51%.11 
 
4.1 The Japanese market and the emergence of outsourcing in China 
China’s outsourcing industry has grown year on year, reaching 1.43 billion USD in 2006, as 
shown in the table below. Outsourcing in the form of exports of software services was already 
well underway in China by 2001, but in the beginning, firms were mainly focused on the 
Japanese market. Interestingly, most of the outsourcing firms that have succeeded in the Japanese 
“market” (i.e., working for Japanese systems integrator clients on work for Japan) started 
independently of the other services and products firms, suggesting that the competencies needed 
were completely unalike. Furthermore, not all of the few earlier firms that tried to move into 
software outsourcing have been successful, against suggesting that prior competencies might hold 
one back. This is not unlike the early experiences of Indian services firms that tried to move the 
other way - into products.  
 
                                                
11
 Statistics are from International Data Corporation (http://www.idc.com). 
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In 2006, China’s software outsourcing markets comprised of Japan (61%), the US (21.8%), 
Europe (4.7%) and others (12.5%). The Japanese market accounted for 872 million USD (CCID). 
The Japanese market still accounts for 59% of China’s outsourcing revenue, versus the US 
market’s 23%.12 While the bulk of the firms that we interviewed serviced US MNCs, the size of 
the Japanese market, and its attraction for Chinese firms that want to go directly offshore, make it 
worthwhile describing the model at least in brief. At least two firms (Sinocom and Neusoft) have 
a very significant presence in the Japanese software outsourcing market. Japanese systems 
integrators are their main clients – these in a sense occupy the same market niches as the US 
systems integrators like Accenture and EDS. For Neusoft, 38.5% of their work is for Toshiba and 
ALPINE, while 15.4% is for mobile phone manufacturers like Sony-Ericsson, Nokia and 
Motorola, 12.8% is for Sony and Panasonic, 12.8% for Hewlett Packard, and 20.5% for other 
firms. One of the issues that Chinese firms have reported in dealing with Japanese clients is the 
greater degree of control and specificity that is exercised by these clients. 
 
Insert 1: Size of China’s Software Outsourcing Services  
 
Year 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Market size 
(100 million US$) 
3.25 4.70 6.33 9.20 14.30 
Source: CCID consulting, 2007a 
 
 
With the rise of government interest in the early 2000s, further efforts were made to improve the 
capability of the workforce and firms. Beijing, Shanghai, Xian, Dalian, and Shenyang were 
amongst a number of cities attempting to outsource to the Japanese and US markets, and in fact, 
the first three as well as Tianjin, Shenzhen and Chengdu were designated by the national 
                                                
12
 In another report, the Japanese market accounted for 59% of China’s outsourcing revenue, versus the US market’s 
23%. Data from Analysis (http://www.analysys.com) 
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government as software export bases.13 In 2001, a common strategy of regional governments in 
Xian, Dalian and other cities was to create science parks as well as to provide training on the 
Japanese language - a skill that many Chinese were able to pick up due to compatibilities in the 
written language scripts.14 Many firms were seeking to imitate the success of Neusoft, a 
Shenyang-based firm that had the strongest export performance from 2001 through 2005. As we 
showed earlier, it achieved this mostly by servicing the Japanese market. Other firms have come 
up in the ranks, with one of the most successful of all outsourcing firms in Beijing recently being 
Sinocom, another firm focused 90% on Japan. More recently, many software companies have 
also focused on BPO, in particular, to the Japanese and Korean markets.  
 
4.2. MNCs and outsourcing needs from the Chinese ‘domestic market’  
Since 2001, and especially in recent years, another new set of outsourcing providers has emerged 
in China (as with the outsourcing providers to Japan). This new breed of firms stress work and 
for and relationships with Western multinationals to service the Chinese market. In order to 
discuss this trend, it is necessary to understand the role of foreign (Western) MNCs and the 
domestic market. This has in some way been concomitant with the rise of firms from other 
markets entering China. There has perhaps no stronger interest exhibited by MNCs to enter a 
developing country for its market than has occurred for China. MNCs have dominated the 
software sector in China, including firms such as Microsoft, Oracle, and BEA, and software 
services and systems integration companies like IBM and Accenture. According to an 
                                                
13
 According to CCID Consulting (2007b); also supported by interviewees at the Xian software park, a Shanghai 
software engineering association, and the Beijing Software Industry Productivity Centre. 
14
 The Chinese government has been quite strategic in its support of software enterprises (Tschang and Xue, 2005), 
but much of this followed an R&D investments approach. With the growing success of exports, the government has 
also focused its efforts on promoting outsourcing. Along with its historical investments in research and education 
through the universities and Chinese Academy of Sciences research institutes (both of which are sources of spin-off 
companies), in 2001, the Chinese national government announced plans to designate 35 universities as centres for 
software engineering programs. This would provide as many as 17500 more graduates to the labour force.  
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interviewee at the Beijing Software Industry Productivity Centre (BSIPC), many of these foreign 
MNCs suffer from a location disadvantage (in sourcing labour and accessing clients) when trying 
to service the Chinese market, especially as it becomes fragmented across cities and sectors. 
Interpersonal relationships or “guanxi” have been said to be as vital to conducting business in the 
Chinese software sector as in other sectors (Saxenian, 2003). The difficulty of entering the 
Chinese market may be due to many differences in standards, administrative rules and programs 
across regions and cities.15 In this environment, MNCs have a greater need to “localize” products 
and content. On the other hand, many Chinese product and systems integration companies do not 
have the capability to do higher end services like systems consulting and design, but do have 
lower level capabilities like localization, customization and software-hardware systems 
integration. Thus, a convenient marriage was waiting between MNCs and selected domestic firms 
that the former could outsource some of their basic needs to.  
 
4.3 The emergence of new Chinese outsourcing firms 
The origins of the (recently rapidly growing) outsourcing domestic firms that service the MNCs 
in the domestic economy are largely private, and none appear to have been government-owned or 
to have involved government investments.16 As noted earlier, a key aspect of the recent Chinese 
outsourcing pattern has been the way in which firms are connecting closely to foreign markets, or 
to MNCs operating in China. We interviewed eight of the firms considered to be rapidly growing 
                                                
15
 There are also at least three markets – corporate, government and private. However, the governmental market is 
strongly bound by policy and regulations, and many software and systems contracts in the past supported domestic 
firms. Furthermore, some Chinese corporate customers have, at least in the past, been difficult to sell services to. 
According to one software firm that we interviewed in 2001, many customers did not have strong IT capability, and 
could not see the value in IT, let along understand how to integrate IT into their business functions. 
16
 In contrast, Tschang and Xue (2005) estimated that as many as a third of the largest systems integrators, and some 
number of other firms with stronger capabilities (e.g. firms engaged in product development), appear to have 
government roots. 
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or occupying niches.17 Most of these represent this new breed of private firm, and many started 
by doing localization and testing for larger MNCs trying to enter China.18 A classic case is 
BeyondSoft, which started by doing the localization and testing of products for MNCs trying to 
enter the Chinese market, including all of Microsoft’s products in China, and Hewlett Packard’s  
products for Asia. Over time, it has systematically worked its way up into higher level work, 
including managing offshore development centres for their clients. According to the CEO, they 
try to learn organizational strategies from Indian companies and Western clients alike (author’s 
interview). For instance, they found that successful firms had engaged in knowledge 
management, and in mirroring client’s organizational structures in their own organizations, and 
consequently developed some of the same internal organizational strategies. Over time, they 
managed to develop application development and maintenance, and to service MNCs’ global 
work. At one point in time, they were trying different strategies, such as opening dedicated 
offshore development centers for MNC clients, as well as exploring joint ventures with Indian 
outsourcing providers. Like other outsourcing companies in Beijing, they started to realize the 
limits of the local labor pool for technical talent, and started to open new centers in the so-called 
“tier 2” cities like Dalian, Wuhan and Tianjin. These new locations helped them to source the 
labor to grow at annual rates of about fifty to one hundred percent for the years after 2001. 
 
Other firms like Worksoft have also come into outsourcing by similar paths to Beyondsoft’s. 
Despite the “work for MNCs’ locally” being the dominant strategy, there are variations within 
this path, and room does exist for other paths. For instance, Worksoft has focused on ODCs far 
more than other firms. Another large firm - IStoneSoft - started as the technical department of 
                                                
17
 IStoneSoft, BeyondSoft, WorkSoft, ChongRan, United Innovation, Symbio, Hexin, Objectiva, and Ufida. 
18
 ChongRan (or CS&S) – is a more diversified, formerly government owned firm which was interviewed earlier and 
which is included for comparison purposes. 
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another firm – Asia EC – and developed consulting expertise through servicing domestic clients. 
They spun off in 2001, accumulating a number of clients from that previous line of work. As they 
grew, they also started to subcontract from MNCs. Like the Indian firms, the Chinese firms also 
learn from (i.e. build capability through interaction with) MNCs. One firm that managed to make 
a transition from earlier roots – namely as a state-owned software enterprise, is ChongRan, which 
has learnt from working from Microsoft and other clients. Finally, another secondary strategy is 
the focus on niche markets, which some of the smaller firms have done. Examples include 
Objectiva (a software developer for the document processing industry), which was eventually 
acquired by one of their clients, and Symbio which operates at the higher value end of the market.  
(Table 6 here) 
Many of these outsourcing firms have their leadership and ‘client engagement’ levels of 
management staffed by Chinese (or overseas Chinese, like Taiwanese) with overseas experience 
and fluency in English. A number of Chinese have returned with valuable experience from 
Silicon Valley in recent years, in part because of the downturn there in the early 2000s.  
 
Interestingly, as a sign of the industry’s phenomenal growth rate, the 2001-2004 timeframe, 
which included the time the Chinese national government was first interested in promoting 
outsourcing, these firms in the current “top tier” were at the time not considered to be even large 
or capable enough to warrant attention. Not all firms have succeeded, however. According to 
interviewees, the government initially supported firms like UFSoft (or “Ufida”), which had 
demonstrated strengths in other areas like products, or firms that were strong in the Japanese 
language. However, some of these government-promoted companies are now lagging behind the 
other, newer firms (i.e. have slower growth rates). This mirrors the effect seen in the products 
side of the software industry.  
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4.4 Industry capability  
Thus far, we have been discussing a story that relates to the GVC. However, there is a capability 
side to the Chinese software industry story as well. Many Chinese software firms had up till a 
couple of years ago been slowly climbing the organizational “process maturity” curve, with the 
software engineering institute’s (SEI) capability maturity model (CMM) level 3 or ISO 9000 
certification being common to many of them. As of 2007, only about seven firms had reached 
CMM level 5 – the highest certification – and not all of them were of significant size or 
reputation (relative to the rest of the Chinese industry). This contrasted with the Indian firms, 
where many (over 50 as recently as a few years ago) had achieved CMM level 5. While even 
more Chinese firms are achieving CMM level 5, the fact is that most of them do not do very 
advanced work, and this may be due to the nature of their capability or their clients’ needs. It is a 
general observation within the industry and by consulting firms alike that the industry is still 
operating mostly at the low end, and has some way to go in order to reach the higher value added 
range of work (CCID Consulting, 2007a). As a result, the work that is done in China may 
actually contain less value added than India, never mind that Indian firms also face a similar type 
of “upgrading to high end work” problem. For example, Neusoft, the largest company and the 
one for which the best data is available, has a revenue per employee of about 25 thousand USD, 
which is about 30% less than that of India’s largest firm’s - TCS. 
 
One possible reason why the work coming to Chinese firms is still at the low value added end 
could be the proverbial chicken and egg problem – getting advanced work when the capability 
and experience is not there yet. Another may have to do with the nature of their position in the 
value chain: They cannot exercise full jurisdiction because of the issue of power (of the client) 
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and position (of the provider) in the value chain. Unlike some of the Indian firms, most of the 
Chinese firms’ clients appear to be the international software vendors themselves. Since these 
ISVs are acting as vendors to other Chinese industries, their tendency has been to try to keep the 
highest value work to themselves. As one interviewee noted (not fully substantiated), Chinese 
firms had or would have a difficult time crossing the “chasm” between doing application 
development for the vendors, and working on services for the vendors’ clients, in part because 
many vendors’ clients were in the US or were “captured” by the clients. In contrast, many clients 
of the Indian software firms are actually end users of vendor software, where software is not part 
of the latter’s core business. Thus, given the “cost centre” nature that this work represents to the 
the Indian firms’ clients, the clients may have no compunction about outsourcing as much of it as 
possible.  
 
Another issue facing the industry is the smaller scale of firms and the difficulty of growing 
quickly. Only five firms had over 2,000 employees, with the largest, Neusoft, having 4,000. This 
contrasts to the largest Indian firms being an order of magnitude larger in size. While there is 
sufficient human capital when the entire country is considered, firms have a difficult time scaling 
up when they consider the need to screen potential employees for proficiency in English or other 
foreign languages, process capability, and other factors where India tends to have a clearer edge.  
 
As a whole, China possesses the base of skills to develop a strong software industry, but this will 
take time. According to some interviewees, one of the bigger problems they may face is the need 
to have stronger language skills and even the appropriate cultural backgrounds to engage with a 
range of Western clients. This may be why in the near future, at least, the East Asian outsourcing 
market will be a more profitable area for it.  
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What the Chinese case suggests in relation to the India case is that the actual position of the client 
in the entire value chain of the industry may be vital to understanding the degree of value that the 
provider can eventually extract from the value chain.  If MNC clients can coordinate the 
outsourced work by controlling the highest stages of the value chain, they may be more willing to 
outsource more of the value chain to the provider – as is done in India.  
 
In general, there is a need to recognize how the domestic market focus has started the industry 
somewhat differently, and can play a protective role for nascent firms by forcing cooperation 
between them and the larger MNCs. Thus, different actors can interact differently and shape an 
outsourcing industry. However, despite the presence of government policy in shaping the 
environment for factor inputs (e.g. labour), the policy of selecting firms has by and large been 
unsuccessful, and recent entrants have not originated from state institutions or been the 
beneficiary of state resources.  
 
4.5 The emerging ‘regional’ Chinese software MNC 
The largest Chinese software firms are experiencing ultra rapid growth, both in products and 
outsourcing. As a consequence, they are exporting products and services, and moving 
aggressively abroad. While the model for internationalization has been established most strongly 
by specific companies in other sectors, such as Haier for white goods, and Lenovo for laptops, in 
software, lead product makers in the domestic market such as China National Software & Service 
Company, Kingdee and Ufida have started creating subsidiaries to serve customers of their 
enterprise management software in parts of South-East Asia. Outsourcing firms such as Longpro 
and Neusoft are creating or acquiring subsidiaries abroad in order to be close to their outsourcing 
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clients. The size and growth of the Chinese economy has allowed some companies to leverage on 
the development of their own products for their domestic markets, and to engage in the 
subsequent export and investment cycle predicted by the PLC theory. Other emerging Chinese 
MNCs are following a pattern more similar to the Indian one. Table 7 presents some examples. 
(Table 7 here) 
5. Back to theory  
When the original theoretical discussions are now brought into confrontation with the evidence 
from the Indian and Chinese software industries, we may conclude that the PLC-OLI theory 
draws a very “sketchy” picture of the evolution of the sector. It is clear that hypothesis #1 is 
confirmed by historical evidence: the CSS and the first MNC are born in the US, the richest 
industrial country; it is also the case that the innovators based in that country exported to and 
invested in the second and third cohort nations. The technology is now being transferred to less 
affluent countries in order to reduce costs and penetrate new markets. Thus, there is support for 
hypothesis #3, third world multinationals are being created as a result of the international 
diffusion of the technology. All these processes generally correspond to the PLC-ILC model. 
However, Indian firms started producing for foreign clients and have lately turning back to their 
home market. Hypothesis #2 appears to be borne out more clearly in China (and possibly will 
eventually apply to other LDCs) than to India, but this is not to say that a domestic market will 
form strong companies. Even in China’s case, with the strongest domestic market possible, the 
companies being borne are still not yet competitive with India’s (on outsourcing services), or 
with Western MNCs (on products). In the end, the real story is really about how firms move to or 
from their home and foreign markets, depending on market conditions and their initial starting 
conditions. 
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Indian firms are clearly investing in North America and Western Europe (particularly in the UK), 
where they export the majority of their services. Also, a few Chinese firms, such as Longtop and 
Neusoft try to develop a similar strategy, but by necessity have had to take small first steps to the 
regional market first. This is in accordance with Hypothesis #4 as well as the PLC predictions. 
However, fewer Chinese firms than Indian ones have made their mark abroad. We find some 
evidence of both Chinese and Indian firms investing in developing countries (as in hypothesis 
#5), such as TCS in Latin America for services, though this is not so much the case for China’s 
product firms, e.g. for Kingdee, the attraction to Asia Pacific and other markets has thus far been 
mainly for sales and distribution.19 
 
In relation to hypothesis #6, Indian firms more clearly, but also some of the largest Chinese firms 
are both exploiting and increasing their strategic knowledge assets abroad. The largest Indian 
firms (with the Chinese firms to a much lesser extent, if at all) are creating operations and even 
greenfield subsidiaries in other countries to exploit their capabilities as software outsourcing and 
development centres. Indian MNCs are also acquiring foreign companies with proprietary 
products to increase their knowledge assets, as well as to use these as bases to service clients in 
their home markets. The smaller and younger Chinese firms are forging alliances with US, and 
Asian partners in order to compete in international markets. There is thus limited but wide 
support for hypothesis #6 and the evolutionary theory of the firm. The caveat for this is that there 
may be other reasons that firms engage in acquisition, e.g. to use their acquisition targets as a 
front end for their outsourcing activities. 
                                                
19
 In fact, some activities border on confirming or disconfirming the hypothesis. For instance, while India’s I-Flex 
has about 400 employees in its Singapore offices servicing the region (according to the author’s research), it is not 
clear whether Singapore should be considered as a “developing” region as far as financial software product 
development, or as an advanced market where advanced skills are available to be invested in acquiring. 
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Finally, both China and India have targeted the software industry in their development plans. 
India, however took the lead, and is reaping the rewards of a first mover, albeit a very large one. 
The very large caveat is that, despite the advantage of the domestic market, Chinese firms - both 
outsourcing and products related - needed a strong leg up, e.g. clients that helped them, and in the 
case of product firms, had the assistance of the government.  
 
However, the specific processes through which technology was transferred to LDC go far beyond 
international trade and foreign direct investment by the original innovators. These other processes 
encompass above all the outsourcing practices, in other terms, the insertion on LDC firms in 
global value chains, as well as a clear evolution of these LDC firms towards increasing 
participation in the highest value-added segments of the value chain. More and more often we see 
Indian firms participating in the development of entirely new applications, mostly marketed by 
large Western software companies, but sometimes sold under the trademarks of Indian companies 
themselves. Secondly, it may be less critical as to whether firms start first by exports (as Indian 
firms have done), or on products and services for the domestic market (as Chinese firms have 
done). What is perhaps more important is that firms have opportunities to build competencies and 
deeper connections to the global value chains, and occupy defensible market niches. Ultimately, 
some convergence does seem to be occurring, as with Indian firms now looking to the domestic 
market, and Chinese firms moving towards international outsourcing. The other common trait is 
that both industries have encountered resistance in moving to the higher end of work, and that to 
some degree, products and services do not easily mix. Outsourcing companies, especially in 
China, have tended to be new entrants, and not firms that had earlier lives as product companies. 
Product firms in China often think differently, at least initially, and thus have to follow a different 
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path. In contrast, many Indian services firms have tended to be reluctant to get into the products 
business. On the other hand, some Indian firms have also used their services work to fund their 
product development. Taken as a whole, all of this suggests a complex picture between the 
functions and strategies of products and services. 
 
Also, high value added outsourcing as well as the need to move closer to original software design 
is pushing the Asian companies to acquire independent software publishers in Canada, the 
European Union and the United States. These third world multinationals are thus not simply 
expanding themselves in other developing countries, but they are aggressively moving towards 
the countries where “original software” is produced. Their technological capabilities expanded 
through the penetration of new markets; they started learning from their outsourcing clients; now 
they are learning from final customers and competitors. 
 
This delocalisation of the CSS industry is not a purely economic process as depicted by the PLC-
OLI model. Its institutional dimensions are key. For both China and India, higher education has 
been a priority for decades. The public support of the industry through export promotion, 
technology parks, and government procurement is evident in both countries. The insistence of the 
innovation system perspective on the importance of institutions is thus well supported by our 
history-friendly narratives. In addition, the processes through which technological capabilities are 
acquired are neither lineal nor identical from one country to the other, as the cases of Chinese and 
Indian software firms tend to show. 
 
 
 
 41 
6. Conclusions 
The Chinese and Indian software industries have followed two different paths, but are to some 
degree qualitatively if not quantitatively converging on one another as they continue to diversify 
and increase value added activities. It is difficult to identify representative firms, as companies 
can develop many different strategies in order to compete and increase their capabilities and 
profitability – even as they all operate within the same overall “envelope” of paths, namely, the 
participation in a global or other defined value chain. Some of the Indian firms have aggressively 
moved into BPO in other developing countries while others are more prone to develop their own 
products under their own trademarks; still others are moving into the development of custom 
software and new application development for established firms. Yet, in spite of their differences, 
the largest Indian firms show a persistent pattern of moving up within the international value 
chain towards higher value added segments.  
 
The Chinese and Indian software firms have also emerged, or are emerging, in the international 
markets. Indian MNCs are by far the largest and most active. However, Chinese firms are 
appearing with their own products, designed for their fledging domestic market. Conversely, 
Indian firms are acquiring foreign designed products through the takeover of niche firms based in 
North America and Western Europe, but also as part of a wider desire to integrate products into 
their portfolio, and to develop bases for continuing to add value to their overseas operations. 
 
In addition, cultural factors matter in explaining the specific patterns of growth and catching up. 
It may be the case that the linguistic abilities of Indian programmers and managers helped them 
to more easily assimilate Western technologies and organizational practices, giving Indian firms a 
head start (and continuing to provide one as compared to their Chinese counterparts). However, 
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Chinese companies are learning from their Japanese clients, as well as from Western competitors 
in their domestic market. Multiple learning processes are thus at work through which the most 
dynamic firms in both countries are increasing their capabilities and catching-up with industry 
leaders. 
 
There is no universal best way to catching up among LDCs either. China and India are showing 
important differences. While other countries are following behind, including ones in South East 
Asia, Eastern Europe and Latin America, for the most part, the important mechanisms appear to 
be at firm level. These differences are evident in the markets they conduct outsourcing for (each 
country has taken advantage of different linguistic abilities); the size of their domestic markets 
has also played a large part. Chinese firms were initially less prone to become international and to 
search for foreign markets, due to the size of their own domestic demand, but are now venturing 
out internationally to both exploit their cultural position (through outsourcing subsidiaries in 
Japan and the USA and through partnerships and subsidiaries for product sales in the Asia-
Pacific). Indian firms are moving abroad in order to exploit knowledge in the labor pools, as well 
as to find new markets in Asia, Latin America, North America and Western Europe – this being a 
consequence of the small size of their national market. They are also acquiring product 
subsidiaries in advanced countries to increase their knowledge assets and accomplish other 
strategic goals. 
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Table 1: Global IT expenditures, 2006-7 
(Amounts in USD billions) 
 2006 2007 Growth (%) 
IT services 467 496 6.3% 
BPO 421 462 9.7% 
Packaged software 230 249 8.3% 
Hardware 452 478 5.8% 
Total 1570 1685 7.3% 
 
Source: IDC, NASSCOM, according to TCS, 2007-8 Annual Report, p. 55. 
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Table 2: The top IT software and service exporters (excluding ITES-BPO) from India, 
2004-5. 
Rank Company  Exports 
(U$M) 
Country 
1 Tata Consultancy Services 1,644 India 
2 Infosys Technologies 1,502 India 
3 Wipro Technologies 1,198 India 
4 Satyam Computer Systems 745 India 
5 HCL Technologies 588 India 
6 Patni Computer Systems 342 India 
7 I-flex Solutions 245 US (Oracle) 
8 Mahindra British Telecom 202 India-UK JV 
9 Polaris Software Labs 154 India 
10 Perot Systems TSI (India) 145 US 
11 Hexaware Technologies 129 India 
12 Larsen & Toubro Infotech 123 India 
13 MASTEK 121 India 
14 iGate Global Solutions 118 India 
15 Siemens Information Systems 111 Germany 
16 Mphasis BFL 103 India-US JV 
17 Tata Infotech 102 India 
18 NIIT Technologies 99 India 
19 Flextronics Software Systems 94 US 
Total  7765  
 
Source: Nasscom, as compiled by Balakrishnan (2006), and completed. 
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Table 3: Largest Indian software multinationals 
Rank Company Employees 
2007 
Sales 2007 
(US$) 
Sales per 
employee 
(000$) 
Year 
Founded 
1 TCS 110,000 4.3 billion 39 1968 
2 Wipro 79,832 3.47 billion 43 1945 
3 Infosys 88,601 3.1 billion 35 1981 
4 Satyam 49,200 2.1 billion 43 1987 
5 HCL Technologies 42,000 1.4 billion 33 1976 
6 Patni Computer Systems 14,000 560 million 40 1978 
7 Hexaware Technologies 7,068 253 million 36 1990 
8 L&T Infotech 7,000 250 million 36 2001 
9 Polaris Software Labs 8,500 225 million 26 1988 
10 Mindtree 5,500 165 million 30 1999 
11 NIIT Technologies 4,500 221 million 49 1981 
12 KPIT Cummins 4,200 102 million 24 1990 
13 Zensar Technologies 4,100 143 million 35 1991 
14 Geometric Software 3,000 99 million 33 1984 
16 Subex Azure 1,200 100 million 83 1992 
Source: Annual Reports, company websites 
 
Table 4: Some Indian software companies and their products 
Name of firm Product specialty Representative proprietary products  Live US 
trademarks 
Accord Software Communications SmartWoks, AutoSensorLab No 
Brainvisa e-learning RapideL, bvlite, bvLMS Yes 
Cynapse Internet Cyn.in, SyncNotes, SafeKeys Yes 
Geometric Software Engineering CAMWorks, DFMPro Yes 
Infosys Banking, others Finacle Yes 
Nucleus Software Banking & finance FinnOne Suite, Cash@will, 
BankONet, PowerCARD, FMS 
Yes 
Sasken Communications Wireless protocol stacks Yes 
Subex Azure Communications SubexAzure Yes 
TCS Finance BANCS Yes 
Virinchi Enterprise Enterprise Enabler 3.0, PEE, CPE, 
e-logistics, e-sales, e-trading 
No 
 
Source: Annual Reports, USPTO 
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Table 5: Three Indian software MNCs 
TCS is the largest and oldest Indian software MNC. It was founded in 1968, within the Tata 
group of companies. By the end of 2007, TCS had 116,300 employees in 57 countries, and 
US$5.7 billion in sales. By 2008, TCS has nine Innovation R&D labs in India, as well as one in 
California and another in England. Its oldest lab is located in Pune, India, and was established in 
1981. It conducts R&D (1.3% of sales) in software and process engineering. 
TCS has been growing abroad through both greenfield investments (i.e. UK, 1975, Hungary, 
2001; Uruguay, 2002; Argentina, 2005…), and acquisitions (Chile, 2005, Australia, 2006; 
England, 2006; Sweden, 2006; Switzerland, 2006…). TCS is mostly a BPO and consulting 
software firm. However, many of these new subsidiaries have their own products, which are 
complementary to TCS ones. In 2006, for instance, TCS bought for US$26 million, Financial 
Network Services Pty, an Australian software firm with BANCS, a high-performance banking 
solution installed in 115 banks over 35 countries. The software is now in use in the major banks 
of India, and is making its way towards Latin American banks through TCS subsidiaries in the 
region. By 2007, BANCS was the second most used universal banking solution and the third 
retail banking solution in the world. In 2007-8, TCS revenues were obtained from North 
America (50%), UK (20%), Continental Europe (9%), India (8%), other Asia (5%) and other 
America (5%). By segments, its revenue was divided into 75% IT solutions and services (mostly 
applications development and maintenance), 6.5% infrastructure services, 6.2% BPO and other.  
Infosys is headquartered in Bangalore. Founded in 1981, it had 94,000 employees in June 2008, 
with total revenue of $4.2 billion USD. Established in the United States since its early years, it 
has offices in 13 European countries, as well as in Australia, Canada, China, Japan, and the 
Philippines. It opened its first Latin American subsidiary in Monterrey, Mexico in 2007. Like the 
other Indian software MNCs, Infosys tries to locate itself in fast-growth markets and not only in 
low-growth traditional developed countries. North America represents 62% of Infosys revenues, 
Europe 28%, India 1.8% an the rest of the world 8.6%. As a percentage of revenue, since 2004 
Europe is growing and North America is declining. In terms of services, application 
development and maintenance represented 445% in 2008, against 24% of consulting services, 
7.5% of testing services, 6% of BPO and others. Products represented 3.6% of total revenues, 
and growing. 
Wipro was founded in 1945, and diversified in information technology in 1980. Its IT arm has 
now 95,000 employees and total revenue of $5 US billion. Headquartered in Bangalore, it has 
now subsidiaries in 29 countries. Since 2003, Wipro has been acquiring companies in Europe in 
order to obtain skills and competencies as well as niche technologies in financial securities, 
utilities and retail trade. By mid-2006, Wipro had spent $310 million in acquiring over ten firms. 
Another six companies were bought in 2006-7. Its compounded annual growth rate has been 
over 25% for the last ten years. Wipro was the first company in the world to win the PCMM 
(People Capability Maturity Model) certification from the Software Engineering Institute at 
Carnegie Mellon University. In 2008, 55% of its revenues came from application development 
and maintenance, 12% from technology infrastructure service, 11% from package 
implementation, 12% from testing services, 8% from BPO, and 1% from consulting. In 
geographical terms, 63% of revenues came from North America, 32% from Europe, 3% from 
Japan and 10% from the rest of the world. Products represented 3.8% of sales. 
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Table 6: Top 20 Software Services Outsourcing Firms in China (2007)  
 
Ranking English name Employee 
Capability                              
level 
(CMM) 
Representative Customers Markets 
* 
1 Neusoft Group Ltd. 12,000** 
CMM5, 
CMMI5              NokiaIBMSAPNEC 
US, 
Japan 
2 Insigma Technology 4000 
CMM3 
*** 
State Street Corporation, Microsoft, 
Hitachi, NEC, Tokyo Stock Exchange, 
Nomura Securities 
US, 
Japan 
3 hiSoft Technology International Ltd. >2300 CMM5 
IBM, Oracle, Bea, Autodesk, 
HPMicrosoftToshibaMitsubishi 
US, 
Japan 
4 
Dalian Hi-Think 
Computer 
Technology Co., 
Ltd. 
2359 CMM5  GE, NEC Group, Hitachi, NTT DATA, Nihon sys,Ltd. Mitsubish, Sony 
Japan, 
US, 
Europe 
5 Chinasoft International Ltd 4,400 CMM3 Microsoft, IFC 
US, 
Japan 
6 
Camelot 
Information 
System (China) 
Corp., LTD 
>1500 CMMI3 IBM,SAP, Accenture, Bearingpoint, HP US, Japan 
7 Beyondsoft 800 CMMI 3 
Autodesk, Cannon, HP, Kyocera, 
Microsoft, Oracle, CA, Fuji Xerox, IBM, 
McAfee, SAP, Siemens, Sony Ericsson, 
Sun, Websense and Zultys 
US, 
Japan 
Asia 
Pacific 
8 
Worksoft Creative 
Software 
Technology Ltd 
1000 CMMI 2 
IBM, Microsoft, Hewlett-Packard, Oracle, 
General Electric, Sony, Panasonic, 
PeopleSoft, TIBCO, Siemens, Roche  
US, 
Europe, 
Japan 
9 
NEC Advanced 
Software 
Technology 
(Beijing) Co., Ltd 
850 CMMI5 NEC Japan 
10 
HANNA 
(Shanghai) 
Strategies Ltd 
 
800 - - - 
11 Shanghai Chuwa Software Co., Ltd 1300 CMMI 3 NRI, Mitsubishi, Fujitsu Japan 
12 Shanghai Wicresoft Co., Ltd 1000 CMM3 - 
Japan, 
US 
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13 
iSoftStone 
Information 
Service 
Corporation  
3500 CMMI5 Motorola, Symbio, Sony Ericsson, GlaxoSmithkline 
US, 
Japan, 
Europe, 
Korea 
14 
Trans Cosmos 
Information 
Creative (China) 
Co., Ltd. 
620 CMMI3 - Japan 
15 
Fujian Fujitsu 
Communication 
Software Co., Ltd 
257 CMMI 5  Fujitsu, CISCO, ORACLE, IBM, HP, MICROSOFT Japan 
16 DGT 1000 CMM3 GE, Microsoft US 
17 iVision Shanghai Co., Ltd. 162 - 
Mitsubishi, SAP, IBM, IT Frontier, 
Microsoft Japan 
18 Dilingtong 200 CMM3 Mitsubishi Japan 
19 
Nanjing Fujitsu 
Nanda Software 
Technology Co., 
Ltd 
215 CMMI5 Fujitsu Japan 
20 Intasect Inc 180 - - Japan 
 
 
 
Notes 
1. Table has been constructed from data from a China outsourcing website as well as from 
company websites and annual reports. 
2. While revenues are not available for most of the firms, six of the top five firms have 
revenues in the 100 to 200 million USD range. 
3. This table should only be used for representative purposes, as other lists of top 20 
companies do not include some of the companies in this list, nor do some of the more 
sizeable companies in other lists show up in here. 
 
* Markets may be the origin of clients, but may not be the ultimate destination of the work. 
 
** This is for the total number of employees, including outsourcing. The outsourcing division 
alone reports 4,000 or more employees. 
*** Multiple subsidiaries within this holding company hold varying CMM levels between 2 and 
3. 
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Table 7: Chinese firms abroad 
Longtop was founded in 1996, and headquartered in Xiamen, Longtop is a more traditional 
outsourcing service provider, targeting the rapidly growing Chinese financial industry, with 
offices in Atlanta, New York, Seattle, and Toronto. In 2007, Longtop entered the New York 
Stock Exchange. Longtop had 1659 employees in March 2008, and revenues (in 12 months 
ended March 2008) of 66.6 Million USD, up 67% year-to-year. Also in 2007, Longtop acquired 
Minecode, a 150-employees firm based in Seattle, WA. This was the first international 
acquisition of Longtop. Minecode has complementary capabilities in application development, 
testing, data warehousing, and knowledge management. Longtop has five solution delivery 
centres, three research centres (Beijing, Shanghai and Xiamen) and 39 service centres located in 
20 provinces throughout China.  
Kingdee. Headquartered in Shenzhen, Kingdee International Software Group was founded in 
1993. Chinese leader in ERP solutions, the company is quoted in the Hong Kong Stock 
Exchange since 2005. In 2007, Kingdee has announced alliances with IBM to enter the e-
commerce application market, and with Microsoft for other products targeting the Chinese 
market. Kingdee owns three ERP products, including K/3, the ERP product with the largest 
number of users in China, and is developing in Asia Pacific (Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, 
Thailand, and other countries) through subsidiaries and joint ventures. Kingdee had 4000 
employees in 2008. Sales figures for 2007 were 112 million USD. 
UFIDA Software was founded in 1988; headquartered in Beijing, it is quoted in the Shanghai 
Stock Exchange. In 2007 UFIDA’s revenues were 1.1 billion CNY (160 million USD). UFIDA 
is one of the largest Chinese software firms, with 6175 employees (as of June 2008), operating 
in all areas of management software and mobile communications. Its proprietary products 
include U8, an integrated management solution for SMEs. Close to 60% of its sales come from 
its ERP solution. Besides, UFIDA conducts global software outsourcing, particularly to the 
Japanese market. UFIDA opened its Tokyo subsidiary in 2004. UFIDA also has subsidiaries in 
Singapore and Thailand and its software is used throughout Asia-Pacific. 
Neusoft is the largest software company in China with over 12,000 employees in July 2007 and 
sales of 355 million USD in 2006; the company is quoted in the Shanghai Stock Exchange since 
1996. Two Northeastern University (Shenyang, China) professors founded Neusoft in 1991. 
Neusoft is still headquartered in Shenyang. It is now the number one outsourcing company in 
China, and has subsidiaries in Japan and the United States (since 2001) through greenfield 
investments, as well as service centres in the Hungary, India, and the United Arab Emirates. 
Neusoft has several R&D Centres in China, the oldest one being located at Northeastern 
University. In 2007, Neusoft became the first Chinese company to be ranked in the Global 
Outsourcing Top 25 in the world. 
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